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Vice Admiral Albert P. Niblack commanded the U.S. naval base at Gibraltar and US naval forces in the 
western Mediterranean during the final year of World War One, for which he received the 
Distinguished Service Medal. At some point afterwards he wrote an account of the U.S. Navy’s role 
at Gibraltar which was submitted for publication to the U.S. Naval Institute journal Proceedings. The 
typescript ran to 57 double-spaced pages and being too long for a journal article, was never used. It 
ultimately found its way into the U.S. National Archives where it languished unnoticed for several 
decades. It is now published in this booklet with additional biographical and historical material 
edited by John Hattendorf. This includes an interesting short essay by Niblack on his appreciation of 
the role of the U.S. Navy World War One. 
The naval base at Gibraltar in 1917 is described by Niblack as having become the largest cargo 
convoy port in the world. This was because it was the hub from which supplies for Southern France, 
Italy, North Africa, Salonika and the Near East were assembled and dispatched. The supplies 
themselves came in predominately from Great Britain and its empire, the U.S. and South America. 
Niblack describes how the small breakwater-protected harbour at Gibraltar could only 
accommodate a limited number of warships, hospital ships and troopships and was always 
overcrowded, with berthing spilling out into the waters of neutral Spain.  
The vast majority of ships passing through the port were in fact berthed in Gibraltar Bay, which 
Niblack notes: “It was only by courtesy that the adjacent waters of Spain were tacitly regarded as 
Gibraltar harbour”. That German spies could easily monitor the movement of ships was always a 
concern, no less so because around 3,000 dockyard workers commuted from Spain to work in the 
harbour every day. There was also the additional potential for a U-boat attack on the bay itself, 
which never happened. 
It is interesting to note that there was in fact only one escorted convoy sent from the U.S. to 
Gibraltar, which sailed in January 1918. All other shipping sent on that route during the war sailed 
independently. The convoys covered the Mediterranean and the run to the east and west coasts of 
Great Britain. Escorts at Gibraltar would escort outward bound vessels to the U.S. out to 10 degrees 
west, after which they sailed alone. There was always a shortage of escort ships which lead to the 
taking up of coastguard cutters and yachts. Niblack points out that even by March 1918 the number 
of escorts was only two-thirds of what was needed, leading to a quarter of ships still sailing in and 
out of the Mediterranean unescorted. 
Gibraltar was also an important coaling station. Niblack describes how in order to maximise cargo 
space, the majority of ships sailing from the U.S. only carried enough coal to reach their destinations. 
The British provided the coal to keep the ships moving which maximised cargo capacity. Tables show 
that in January to April 1918 ships proceeding to the U.S. took on 125,121 tons of coal at Gibraltar, 
furnished by Britain. 
A short chapter also describes the development of the Naval Overseas Transport Service (N.O.T.S.) 
which began life in January 1918. The ships which it operated were entirely crewed by naval 
personnel and its numbers expanded to over 35,000 men in 347 ships by the Armistice. The N.O.T.S. 
represented a third iteration in the employment of U.S. flagged merchant ships in the war alongside 
those under charter and those with armed guards on board. Niblack makes the point that this made 
it difficult to give an accurate figure for the number of U.S. merchant ships sunk during the conflict. 
He calculates that the total was 159, including 13 N.O.T.S. ships. This compared to 3,147 British ships 
lost. 
Clearly smooth cooperation with the Britain and the other Allies was vital to the running of the 
convoys. Niblack praises the Royal Navy’s senior officer at Gibraltar, Rear Admiral Heathcoate S. 
Grant for the smooth incorporation of the newly arrived U.S. ships into the convoy arrangements. He 
notes that Grant had been Naval Attaché in Washington just prior to the war and that “his previous 
association with our people made our association simple and sympathetic”. There was a job to do 
and as he concluded: “our association with the allied forces was a sacred bond. We went across to 
keep faith and we kept it”.  
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